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Expatriates, Subsidiary Autonomy and the Overseas Subsidiary 
Performance of MNEs from an Emerging Economy   
 
Abstract 
Despite a growing body of research on the role of expatriates in subsidiary 
performance, the mechanisms through which expatriates affect subsidiary 
performance are still the subject of debate. Drawing on the resource dependence 
theory, we examine the indirect effect of expatriates on subsidiary performance via 
subsidiary autonomy based on a sample of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
The findings show that an increase in expatriates reduces the level of subsidiary 
autonomy and thus negatively affects subsidiary performance. We also find that the 
institutional quality of host countries reinforces the negative impact of expatriates on 
subsidiary autonomy, but reduces the importance of the latter on subsidiary 
performance.  
 
Keywords: Chinese MNEs, expatriates, subsidiary autonomy, institutional quality, 
subsidiary performance 
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Introduction 
Over recent decades, the influence of expatriates on subsidiary performance 
has been an important theme in international business and international human 
resource management (HRM) research (Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Gaur, Delios, & 
Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003a). The term expatriates in this study refers to parent country 
nationals from multinational enterprise (MNE) parent companies assigned to their 
foreign subsidiaries (Tan & Mahoney, 2006). As one of the most important resources 
of MNEs, expatriates are expected to achieve a wide range of corporate objectives 
including facilitating firm-specific knowledge transfer (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004; 
Wang, Tong, & Koh, 2004), establishing international operations and opening new 
markets, as well as gaining international experience. These, in turn, help MNEs obtain 
competitive advantage and enhance their subsidiary performance (Delios & Beamish, 
2001; Tan & Mahoney, 2006).  
While the existing literature in this area has recognised the importance of 
expatriates for the subsidiary performance of MNEs, much research has focused on 
the performance benefits of expatriates from developed economy MNEs, such as the 
US, Europe and Japan, and has tended to assume that the knowledge to be transferred 
from headquarters to subsidiaries through expatriates positively affects subsidiary 
performance (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Gong, 2003b; Tan & Mahoney, 2006). 
However, in the past decade, outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from emerging 
economy MNEs (EEMNEs) has increased rapidly. The increasing presence of 
EEMNEs in the global market place has raised the question as to whether the findings 
on the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance based on 
established MNEs can be applied to EEMNEs. In particular, we know very little about 
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the impact of internal control mechanisms through expatriates on subsidiary 
performance and whether such an impact is contingent on the institutional 
environment of host countries.  
In addition, previous research on expatriation and subsidiary performance has 
overwhelmingly focused on the direct impact of expatriates on subsidiary 
performance through the lenses of transaction-cost economics (TCE) (Benito, et al., 
2005; Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Tan & Mahoney, 2006) and institutional theory 
(Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004) without considering the role of subsidiary autonomy. 
However, as an important internal strategic resource of MNEs, expatriates are 
supposed to carry out the mission of headquarters, and MNE parents may exert 
control over a subsidiary by adjusting the level of expatriates in host countries. Thus, 
expatriates not only affect knowledge transfer between the MNE parent and the 
subsidiary, but also subsidiary autonomy, which in turn influences subsidiary 
performance. Although the effect of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance 
has become an important theme in international HRM research (Gammelgaard, et al., 
2012; Gomez & Werner, 2004; Kawai & Strange, 2014; McDonald, Warhurst, & 
Allen, 2008; Slangen & Hennart, 2008), the mediating role of subsidiary autonomy in 
the relationship between the level of expatriates and subsidiary performance has been 
under-explored, especially in the case of EEMNEs. It is important to delineate the 
path from expatriates to subsidiary performance via subsidiary autonomy in host 
countries with different institutional environments, given that EEMNEs originated in 
under-developed institutional environments and they may respond to the institutional 
environments of host countries through altering internal control systems such as 
expatriate staffing and subsidiary autonomy. Thus, the link between expatriates, 
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subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance may be contingent on the 
institutional environment of a host country.  
To address the research gaps, we adopt the resource dependence perspective 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to examine the following research questions. To what 
extent does subsidiary autonomy mediate the impact of expatriates on subsidiary 
performance? To what extent does host-country institutional quality moderate the 
relationship between expatriates and the subsidiary performance of EEMNEs? We 
propose that subsidiary autonomy may act as an intermediate factor between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance given the institutional quality of host countries.   
We chose China as our research setting due to the rapid growth of Chinese 
outward FDI, with an average annual growth rate of almost 50% (WIR, 2014). 
China’s outward FDI was only $12 billion in 2005, but reached $77.2 billion in 2012, 
which accounted for approximately 61% of outbound FDI from emerging economies. 
China’s outward FDI overtook inward FDI in 2014 making China a net capital 
exporter for the first time. The new ‘One Belt One Road’ strategy announced in 
September 2013, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
and the Silk Road fund will continue to encourage large scale outward investment. 
These aspects indicate that China can serve as an appropriate and important empirical 
setting where we can examine the factors affecting EEMNEs’ overseas operations. It 
is also timely to study the impact of the subsidiary control strategies adopted by 
Chinese MNEs that have heavily invested in a wide range of host countries with 
varying degrees of institutional quality.  
This study extends the existing literature on expatriation and subsidiary 
performance in general, and EEMNEs in particular in three main ways. First, our 
research extends resource dependence theory (RDT) in order to understand the extent 
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to which subsidiary autonomous strategies mediate the influence of expatriation on 
subsidiary performance. The findings from this study provide new insights into the 
mediating mechanism of subsidiary autonomy and move beyond previous studies 
which have mainly focused on the direct impact of expatriation on subsidiary 
performance without considering the mediation role of subsidiary autonomy. Second, 
we further extend the existing research by examining the moderating role of host-
country institutional quality on the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
performance. The findings shed new light on the institutional conditions under which 
expatriates affect subsidiary performance, and add much needed empirical evidence 
regarding the interrelationship between internal control mechanisms and EEMNEs’ 
overseas performance. Finally, while much existing literature in this domain is based 
on MNEs from advanced economies, our study is one of the first to systematically 
investigate the relationships among expatriation, subsidiary autonomy and the 
subsidiary performance of EEMNEs. In doing so, we advance existing research by 
capturing the complex linkage between EEMNE parents and their subsidiaries 
through expatriates and subsidiary autonomy. Specifically, EEMNEs parents adjust 
the level of expatriates and subsidiary autonomy to reduce external dependence in 
host countries with underdeveloped institutions, and engage in knowledge exploration 
in the countries with high institutional quality.  
This paper is structured as follows: The next section focuses on theory and 
hypotheses. We then introduce the sample and variables used in the study in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results, followed by discussion of the findings and 
highlighting of the contributions. Section 6 concludes.   
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
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Theoretical Background 
The extant literature has used multiple theories to examine the optimal level of 
expatriates, such as institutional theory (Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004), transaction-cost 
economics (TCE) (Benito, et al., 2005; Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Tan & Mahoney, 
2006) and resource-based theory (Tan & Mahoney, 2006). The findings from existing 
studies have enhanced our understanding of the importance of expatriates in MNEs’ 
overseas operations. However, these studies have paid little attention to the impact of 
expatriates on subsidiary autonomy (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011) and how 
EEMNEs respond to external uncertainty by adjusting their internal management 
strategies (Davis & Cobb, 2010), such as the levels of localisation (Liu, et al., 2016; 
Lu, et al., 2014; Yildiz & Fey, 2012) and parental support (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; 
Luo, 2003). The resource dependence theory (RDT) has been increasingly influential 
as a theoretical basis for international business research. For example, Lewin et al. 
(2004) suggest that the RDT is a particularly appropriate approach and helps to 
account for the dynamic relationship between an MNE parent and its subsidiaries. 
Thus, this study takes an overarching theoretical view of RDT to examine the indirect 
impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance via subsidiary autonomy.  
RDT considers the behaviour aspect of firms and explains the importance of 
intra and inter-organisational behaviour based on power relationships (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). According to RDT, a host country is endowed with scarce resources 
needed by MNE subsidiaries (Cui, Meyer, & Hu, 2014; Moran, 1985), and a 
dependency situation arises when MNE subsidiaries rely on irreplaceable resources 
controlled by local resource holders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In particular, when 
local institutions are underdeveloped, MNE subsidiaries face increasing risk and 
uncertainty due to ambiguous regulations and perhaps an unstable government. In 
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order to decrease the risk or transaction costs associated with resource acquisition, an 
MNE subsidiary can reduce its dependence on local resources by utilizing more 
internal resources possessed by its parent (Kobrin, 1982). This internal flow may 
consist of not only physical resources but also knowledge and human resources 
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). Thus, the improvement of resource support from 
MNE parents may help to reduce the external dependency of the subsidiaries.  
Expatriates constitute an important internal resource within MNEs and the 
utilisation of expatriates influences the parent-subsidiary relationship (Fang, et al., 
2010). An MNE parent may assign expatriates to the subsidiary as a specific 
governance mechanism (Gong, 2003b). This internal control mechanism helps ensure 
a subsidiary’s compliance with the parent company’s organisational values and 
operational priorities (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005; Boyacigiller, 1990). In addition, 
expatriates can play a key role in facilitating the transfer of firm-specific tacit and 
complex knowledge from a parent to its subsidiary, particularly for recently 
established foreign subsidiaries (Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Wang, et al., 2009). 
Through the formal communication channel and the informal socialisation mechanism, 
expatriates can identify, access and bring relevant parent knowledge to the subsidiary 
(Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977). This knowledge may include corporate culture, 
management styles and ways of conducting business which create causal ambiguity 
and barriers to transfer and imitation (Simonin, 1999). Therefore, an MNE parent will 
have substantial control over its subsidiary through expatriates. The subsidiary in turn 
will rely on its parent for resources and knowledge in order to minimise risk and 
external dependence in host countries with low quality institutions. This suggests that 
expatriates may serve as an internal control mechanism for an MNE parent and affect 
subsidiary autonomy, which in turn impacts on subsidiary performance (McDonald, 
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Warhurst, & Allen, 2008). This implies that the effect of expatriates on organizational 
outcomes is more complex than the existing literature suggests. Therefore, this study 
focuses on the indirect impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance via subsidiary 
autonomy.  
As shown in Figure 1, we propose that expatriates have a negative impact on 
subsidiary autonomy, and a reduction in subsidiary autonomy leads to a decrease in 
subsidiary performance. Furthermore, institutional quality in the host country 
positively moderates the first link (i.e. the relationship between expatriates and 
subsidiary autonomy), but negatively moderates the second link (i.e. subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance) in the mediation relationship. In other words, 
subsidiary autonomy mediates the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
performance, given the institutional quality of the host countries. Taken together, we 
propose a moderated mediation model to capture the complex relationships between 
expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance, given different levels of 
institutional quality.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
The Mediating Role of Subsidiary Autonomy 
Subsidiary autonomy is a complex concept (Young & Tavares, 2004) which is 
commonly defined as the extent to which a subsidiary has the authority to make 
decisions with a degree of independence from the MNE parent (Brooke, 1984; Nell & 
Andersson, 2012; O'Donnell, 2000). If a subsidiary can make decisions on main value 
activities, such as HRM, procurement, marketing and sales (Browman, Duncan, & 
Weir, 2000; Edwards, Ahmad, & Moss, 2002), and enjoy higher levels of decision-
10 
 
 
making power for these value activities (Newburry, Zeria, & Yeheskel, 2003), it will 
have more autonomy. 
A growing body of existing literature has established that subsidiary autonomy 
serves as a mechanism for management control, which affects subsidiary performance. 
For instance, McDonald, Warhurst and Allen (2008) find that there is a positive 
relationship between various degrees of subsidiary autonomy and performance. 
Ambos and Birkinshaw (2010) indicate that subsidiaries achieve superior performance 
by enjoying high levels of local decision-making authority, and by attracting the 
parent company’s attention within the MNE network. Tran et al. (2010) suggest that 
subsidiary autonomy is an important element of MNE strategies and is positively 
associated with subsidiary performance. Similarly, Gammelgaard et al. (2012) present 
evidence that subsidiary performance is increased with subsidiary autonomy. Kawai 
and Strange (2014) also suggest that the appropriate balance between subsidiary 
internal and external factors can help a subsidiary to achieve superior performance. 
Wang, et al., (2014) find that subsidiary autonomy is considered a strategic 
mechanism to overcome EEMNEs’ lack of experience in managing globally dispersed 
businesses and home-country disadvantages. However, little research has 
systematically examined the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
autonomy, as well as the question of whether the autonomy granted to a foreign 
subsidiary will mediate the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
performance.  
We propose that in addition to the direct impact of expatriates on subsidiary 
performance, there may be the indirect impact of expatriates on subsidiary 
performance via subsidiary autonomy. Drawing upon the RDT, expatriates, as 
valuable human resources, are considered an internal control mechanism to reduce 
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external dependence (Chalos & O'Connor, 2004). Assigning expatriates is an 
important way for the headquarters to exercise its power (Gupta & Govindarajan, 
1991). In order to process a substantial amount of information regarding subsidiary 
operating protocols, an MNE parent usually assigns expatriate managers whose 
function will be to increase the channels of communication between the parent 
company and the subsidiary, which guarantees that the parent company’s interests are 
well represented within the subsidiary (Boyacigiller, 1990). Expatriates and subsidiary 
autonomy are closely related to each other. As expatriates can be considered an 
extended form of headquarters control and supervision (Boyacigiller, 1990; Egelhoff, 
1984; Lorange, 1986; Steers & Nardon, 2006), subsidiary autonomy will become 
lower when the level of expatriates is higher. 
On the other hand, a reduction in subsidiary autonomy may reduce subsidiary 
performance due to more limited access to valuable external resources which are 
available locally in host countries. Extant research shows that subsidiary autonomy 
granted by MNE parents has a positive impact on subsidiary performance 
(Gammelgaard, et al., 2012; Gomez & Werner, 2004; McDonald, Warhurst, & Allen, 
2008). Most existing research has argued that less autonomy will discourage the 
subsidiary from fostering a higher level of organisational learning (Luo, 2003), reduce 
parent-subsidiary cooperation (Birkinshaw, et al., 2000), block knowledge creation 
(Young & Tavares, 2004)  and hinder strategic leadership initiatives (Birkinshaw, 
Hood, & Jonsson, 1998). All of these reduce competitive advantages, decreasing 
subsidiary performance. More importantly, a lower level of autonomy may block or 
represent barriers to the access to complementary external resources in host countries. 
For example, operational costs will be significantly increased where companies do not 
work with local suppliers or embed subsidiaries within the local supply network (Fan, 
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Nyland, & Zhu, 2008; Rangan & Drummond, 2011). The subsidiaries with limited 
autonomy find it difficult to bond and cooperate with local businesses without the 
involvement of local managers and employees who have better knowledge of local 
market environments than expatriates (Law, et al., 2009; Selmer, 2004). This will in 
turn negatively influence subsidiary performance.  
In summary, adopting RDT logic, subsidiary autonomy serves as an 
intermediate mechanism through which expatriates can affect subsidiary performance. 
Therefore, departing from the existing research in this domain, we posit a mediation 
path that moves beyond the direct impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance. 
That is, using expatriates can enable the parent company to have tighter control on 
subsidiaries and thus reduce subsidiary autonomy, which in turn leads to a decrease in 
subsidiary performance. Hence, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 1: Subsidiary autonomy mediates the relationship between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance in that the level of expatriates has a negative 
impact on subsidiary autonomy, and a reduction in subsidiary autonomy leads to a 
decrease in subsidiary performance.  
 
The moderating role of host-country institutional quality 
The institutional quality of host countries has long been identified as an important 
factor affecting MNE subsidiary performance (Liu, et al., 2016; Luo & Tung, 2007). 
It refers to the degree of stability and development of the institutional infrastructure of 
host countries, which includes the set of laws, regulations, administrative procedures 
and policies formally sanctioned by the government (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; 
Delios & Henisz, 2003). The existing research reveals that knowledge is more likely 
to be obtained and learned from a host country with well-established institutions 
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where effective institutional protection can be provided for foreign firms operating 
there (Berry, 2006; Buckley, et al., 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007). EEMNEs that lack 
international managerial expertise, international market knowledge and advanced 
technology may be able to acquire these strategic assets when their subsidiaries are 
located in host countries with well-developed institutions. Local firms in these host 
countries are more likely to possess strategic resources needed by EEMENs, but such 
resources are not usually available in the EEMNEs’ domestic markets or in other 
emerging markets (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). The asset-seeking behaviour of 
EEMNEs may reduce the dependence of their subsidiaries on headquarters in such 
host countries (Lu, et al., 2014). This in turn may reduce the need for expatriates 
compared to those subsidiaries in host countries with underdeveloped institutions 
which offer limited opportunities for knowledge exploration. The reduced level of 
expatriates also lessens the control from the corporate parent. This implies that a 
higher autonomy may be achieved by a subsidiary located in those host countries with 
high institutional quality, and thereby gain access to strategic resources and advanced 
knowledge available locally, and hence reduce transaction costs. Thus, the negative 
relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy will be reinforced in those 
host countries with well-established institutions. 
In contrast, when host-country institutions are underdeveloped, the 
institutional environment tends to be risky (Wang, et al., 2014). EEMNEs operating 
within such an environment are subject to increasing external uncertainty and 
decreasing credibility (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Akhter & Lusch, 1998; Delios 
& Beamish, 1999; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2000). According to RDT, a 
subsidiary relies more on the internal resources and knowledge transferred from MNE 
headquarters in order to replace inter-organizational resource exchanges (Feinberg & 
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Gupta, 2009). Expatriates can be used as an internal resource to reduce the external 
dependence when facing uncertainty stemming from the unstable external 
environment. Thus, an increasing level of expatriates may become a pragmatic 
response strategy when EMNE subsidiaries operate in such host countries (i.e. those 
with institutional ambiguities, underdeveloped markets and ineffective enforcement of 
regulations) (Wright, et al., 2005). When uncertainty in business activities is high in a 
host country, centralised subsidiaries are unlikely to overcome the frequent changes 
and unknowns inherent in environmental uncertainty due to a high level of 
bureaucracy in the decision making process as well as the coordination costs 
associated with a high level of centralization (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). This implies 
that extra autonomy needs to be granted to respond promptly to frequent changes 
resulting from increasing external uncertainty. As a result, an increase in expatriates 
from headquarters may lead to a disproportionate decrease in subsidiary autonomy 
when subsidiaries operate in an underdeveloped institutional environment, given that 
subsidiaries in such an environment need more internal resource exchange and a 
higher level of subsidiary autonomy to respond to institutional voids. Hence, we 
propose: 
Hypothesis 2: Host-country institutional quality will influence the negative 
impact of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy such that the negative relationship 
between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy is stronger in host-countries with high 
institutional quality than those with low institutional quality.  
 
Institutional quality in host countries not only moderates the link between 
expatriates and subsidiary autonomy, but also the relationship between subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance. Since institutions are developed to create order 
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and a stable environment, and to promote economic exchange and cooperation (North, 
1990; Williamson, 1985), host-country institutions affect the ability of subsidiaries to 
access external resources and knowledge (Meyer & Sinani, 2009). Well-established 
institutions are able to provide an efficient common infrastructure and reduce 
transactional uncertainty (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). Foreign subsidiaries operating in 
host countries with high institutional quality can easily follow ‘the rules of the game’ 
and gain the information necessary for effective operations (Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 
2011). In addition, well-developed market-supporting institutions may help 
subsidiaries reduce the search costs associated with accessing critical knowledge and 
resources for foreign operations. This indicates that political risks and uncertainty are 
relatively low in host countries with well-developed institutions, so the importance of 
subsidiary autonomy for subsidiary performance may be reduced when operating in 
such a context. This implies that a high level of subsidiary autonomy may not be a 
necessary condition for achieving desirable performance.  
On the other hand, under-developed institutions generate hazards of 
expropriation and transactional uncertainty. Subsidiaries have to rely on greater 
autonomy to deal with political and operational risks. Therefore, subsidiary autonomy 
can have a more positive impact on its performance when a subsidiary has the 
flexibility to respond to frequent changes and instability in host countries with low 
quality institutions. An ‘agile’ approach with regard to local decision making may be 
necessary in order to cope with frequent decision making cycles. Such a mechanism 
can help to ensure effective operations, thus enhancing subsidiary performance. 
Extant research shows that uncertainty in a turbulent environment strengthens the 
positive relationship between autonomy and subsidiary profitability (Andersen, 2005; 
Kawai & Strange, 2014). This suggests that the positive impact of subsidiary 
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autonomy on subsidiary performance will be stronger in host countries with 
underdeveloped institutions. Our argument above lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Host-country institutional quality will influence the positive 
impact of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance such that the positive 
relationship between subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance is stronger in 
host countries with low institutional quality than those with high institutional quality. 
 
Methodology 
Sample and Data Collection 
The data used to test the hypotheses was collected with support from the Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada (APFC) and the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT). The former is an independent non-governmental 
organisation focusing on Canada’s relations with Asia, while the latter is a national 
non-government organisation for the promotion of foreign trade in China. 
Collaboration with the CCPIT enabled us to access members through its local 
representatives who are familiar with these enterprises, and thus encourage 
participation in the survey.  
On the basis of a thorough literature review, the questionnaire was originally 
prepared in English and then, with the assistance of an independent translator, 
translated into Chinese. Following Hoskisson, et al. (2000), we examined the accuracy 
of the survey content through a back-translation technique. We also conducted four 
in-depth interviews with CCPIT officials to cross-check questionnaire items and 
terminology, and to ratify the content and validity of our measurements. The 
questionnaire was modified based on their feedback. A pilot test was conducted by 
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sending out the questionnaire to ten senior managers whose companies were CCPIT 
members. The questionnaire was further revised based on their feedback.   
The sample Chinese companies were randomly selected from the CCPIT’s 
membership, and specifically those that had registered their outward FDI activities 
with Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM). Our original 
sample consisted of 2,000 companies. The CCPIT’s local representatives contacted 
these companies and sent them hard copies of the questionnaire. Of the 2,000 
questionnaires sent out, a total of 365 questionnaires were received with a response 
rate of 18.25%. A comparison of location and industries between the responding firms 
and non-responding ones suggested that the two groups of firms have similar 
distribution patterns in location and industries. After excluding the responses which 
either had missing information or were inapplicable, we were left with 181 
observations. We excluded the firms who were wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries in 
China, given that these companies may have structure and operational processes not 
compatible with Chinese companies (Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007). Our final sample 
size was 181, including 45 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 136 private firms. 
These firms operate in 14 industries and have invested in 49 countries. The detailed 
information on subsidiary locations is presented in Table 1.  
INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
Variables and Measures 
Dependent variables. Following previous studies (Brouthers & Xu, 2002; He, Tian, 
& Chen, 2007; Lu, et al., 2010), a perceptual measure was used to proxy the 
performance of overseas subsidiaries of Chinese MNEs. Some researchers (He, Tian, 
& Chen, 2007; Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994) indicated that perceptual 
measures are appropriate when (1) companies are either unwilling or unable to 
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provide sensitive accounting data; (2) variations in accounting approaches across 
countries is likely to hinder the reconciliation of differences; and/or (3) there are 
fluctuations in exchange rates between home and host countries.  As a widely used 
construct in previous studies (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Birkinshaw, Hood, 
& Young, 2005; He, Tian, & Chen, 2007; Lu, et al., 2010), perceptual measures of 
performance have been proved to possess strong internal consistency and reliability 
(Cooper & Artz, 1995; Ketokivi & Schroeder, 2004).  
We asked the respondents to evaluate the performance of their newly 
established overseas subsidiaries. This focus presents a number of advantages. First, 
respondents are more easily able to differentiate the focal overseas subsidiary from 
other overseas subsidiaries, and thus enhance the reliability of this measure. Second, 
all other key independent variables, i.e. expatriates, host country institutional quality 
and subsidiary autonomy, are directly related to the focal overseas subsidiary. Thus, 
the dependent variable and the key independent variables are compatible and focused 
on the same overseas subsidiary. 
The variable consisted of three items on a seven-point scale (1=very 
dissatisfied; 7=very satisfied): (1) growth rate of sales; (2) growth rate of market share; 
and (3) growth rate of profit in the overseas subsidiary. The confirmatory factor 
analysis showed that the three items were loaded on a single factor, explaining 83.81% 
of the total variance. Cronbach’s alpha reliability for perceived subsidiary 
performance was 0.90, which is greater than 0.60, a commonly acceptable level of 
reliability (Nunnally, 1978).   
Independent variables. Based on Gong (2003a), Konopaske, et al. (2002) and 
Boyacigiller (1990), the level of expatriates was measured as the percentage of 
expatriates in the total workforce. In the survey instrument, the expatriate percentage 
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was calculated by dividing the number of expatriates in a subsidiary by the total 
number of employees in the subsidiary. Traditionally, expatriates are considered 
individuals of any national origin who are transferred outside their home country 
(Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977; Hocking, Brown, & Harzing, 2004). In the context of 
Chinese MNEs, expatriates are considered synonymous with individuals of Chinese 
nationality who work outside China (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005). According to 
Boyacigiller’s (1990) terminology, we use the terms expatriate and parent-country 
national synonymously in the case of Chinese MNEs. Thus, the term, expatriate, is 
considered to be synonymous with parent-country national (PCN) and non-expatriate 
is considered to be synonymous with host-country national (HCN). 
Mediating variables. We followed Williams and van Triest (2009) and 
assessed the level of autonomy based on the respondents’ assessment regarding how 
much autonomy their management team was given to manage the subsidiary in terms 
of strategic and operational decision-making authority. Based on the evaluation and 
the practical insight of the managers from our pilot study, subsidiary autonomy is 
measured by four items along a seven-point scale (1=low; 7=high). The items are 
related to whether subsidiary managers have the authority to (1) decide the scope of 
their operations; (2) make budgetary and financial decisions; (3) hire, reward, promote 
and fire employees; and (4) undertake merger, acquisition and other capital operations. 
The factor analysis showed that the four items converged into a single factor, 
explaining 72.58% of the total variance. Cronbach’s alpha for the measure was 0.87, 
which exceeded the 0.60 cut-off-point (Nunnally, 1978). 
Moderating variables. Based on previous studies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008; Slangen & Tulder, 2009), the objective measurement of the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) in 2010  was used to capture the institutional quality of the host 
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country. The WGI reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 
economies over the period 1996-2013 and includes six dimensions of government: (1) 
voice and accountability; (2) political stability and absence of violence; (3) 
government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law and (6) control of 
corruption. We aggregated the six dimensions and labelled it as institutional quality of 
a host country where a Chinese company has conducted FDI. As each dimension has 
been constructed by compiling a number of primary and secondary data sources, the 
index offers reliable and comprehensive proxies for empirical studies (Oh & Oetzel, 
2011). The values of the WGI were rescaled by adding 2.5 so that the values in our 
sample range from 0 (low institutional quality) to 5 (high institutional quality), which 
helped facilitate the interpretation for the statistical significance of this variable 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). The items were loaded on a single factor, explaining 
84.59% of the variance. The reliability of the measurement was acknowledged with a 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 0.92. Table 2 lists the measurement items above and 
summarizes the confirmatory factor analysis and internal consistency of the scales.  
INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
Control variables. Several variables that may also affect subsidiary 
performance were controlled. First, we included a measure of subsidiary age, which 
was calculated as the number of years of operations within a host country (Delios & 
Beamish, 2001; Fey & Furu, 2008). Second, an MNE parent’s age and size were 
included as control variables. They were calculated as the number of years in business 
and the natural logarithm of the number of employees, respectively (Wijk, Jansen, & 
Lyles, 2008; Zhou, Wu, & Luo, 2007). Third, because parent ownership types also 
matter in a transition economy (Wu & Lin, 2010), we differentiated parent company 
types: state-owned enterprises and private-owned companies. A dummy variable with 
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a value of 1 indicates that the parent company is a state-owned enterprise, and a value 
of 0 indicates a private-owned company. Finally, we created dummy variables to 
control for the industry sector in which a subsidiary locates.  
Common method bias 
As much of the data was collected from the same survey respondents, there may exist 
the potential for the occurrence of common method variance (Krishnan, Martin, & 
Noorderhaven, 2006). We took a number of steps to minimize common method bias. 
First, multiple item constructs were used in our survey, since response biases are more 
likely to occur at the item level rather than at the construct level. In particular, the 
mediating and moderating effect is included in our hypotheses. This approach is 
effective in controlling for the issue of common method variance because complex 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables are not part of the 
respondents’ theory-in-use (Chang, Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010). Second, following 
previous studies (Kemery & Dunlap, 1986; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), we performed 
Harman’s single factor test. The result showed that the single factor model 
demonstrated a poor fit to the data. Third, the level of expatriates, as an independent 
variable, is a formative value rather than a self-perceived measure. In addition, we 
also used an objective measure for the institutional quality of host countries. Taken 
together, the potential extent of common method variance has been reduced 
substantially.  
Empirical Results 
The mean, standard deviations and correlations of the variables used in our analysis 
are presented in Table 3. It can be seen that all correlations among the independent 
variables are fairly low. To avoid potential multicollinearity, we centred the variables 
and computed the interaction terms as a product of the centred scores on the 
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component variables in all analyses. Control variables were included in all regression 
analyses unless specified otherwise. To assess potential multicollinearity, the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) of the matrices of independence variables and covariates were 
computed. None of the VIF values exceed the threshold of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, & 
Kutner, 1990), indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious  concern.  
INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
A moderated mediation model can be tested in a number of ways (Edwards & 
Lambert, 2007; MacKinnon, et al., 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). We follow 
Edwards and Lambert’s (2007) procedure which integrates moderated regression 
analysis and path analysis to comprehensively analyse simultaneous moderation and 
mediation. This includes the first stage (between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy), 
the second stage (between subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance), a direct 
relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance and an indirect effect 
through subsidiary autonomy, as well as the total effect at a particular level of the 
moderator (institutional quality). The detail of our analytical approach based on 
Edwards and Lambert’s procedure is explained in Appendix A. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that subsidiary autonomy mediates the relationship 
between expatriates and subsidiary performance, in which expatriates negatively 
affect subsidiary autonomy and a reduction in subsidiary autonomy leads to a 
decrease in subsidiary performance. Table 4 presents the regression results of 
Hypothesis 1. The first-stage effect of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy in Model 1 
is significantly negative (β=-0.15, p<0.05), whereas the second-stage effect of 
subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance in Model 3 is positive and significant 
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(β=0.43, p<0.01). Furthermore, the direct effect of expatriates on subsidiary 
performance appears to be insignificant (β=-0.12, p>0.10). Therefore, there is a full, 
indirect-only mediation rather than a partial mediation (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010) 
which indicates that the level of expatriates affects subsidiary autonomy but does not 
affect subsidiary performance directly. Therefore, subsidiary autonomy fully mediates 
the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance. This is confirmed by 
Sobel’s test (Sobel, 1982), which is significant (z=-6.95, p<0.01). Consequently, 
Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
The results in Model 2 and Model 5 show that the institutional quality of host 
countries positively moderates the negative impact of expatriates on subsidiary 
autonomy, but negatively moderates the positive impact of subsidiary autonomy on 
subsidiary performance. Thus, we receive support for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3.   
INSERT TABLE 5 NEAR HERE 
Table 5 summarises the results of further testing of Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3. One standard deviation above or below the mean is used to indicate a 
high or low level of host-country institutional quality (Aiken & West, 1991) which 
shows the interrelationship between expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary 
performance at different levels of institutional quality. The first-stage moderation, 
which applies to the first-stage of the indirect effect, was significant (0.55-(-0.17) = 
0.72, p<0.05). The results indicate that the first-stage effect was 0.55 (p<0.05) in the 
host countries with a low level of institutional quality and -0.17 (p<0.05) at a high 
level of host-country institutional quality. Thus, the results further confirm hypothesis 
2, which suggests that the negative relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
autonomy is stronger when institutional quality is high. The second-stage moderation, 
which applies to the second stage of the indirect effect, was significant (0.70-
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0.32=0.38, p<0.05). The second-stage effect was 0.70 (p<0.05) in the host countries 
with a low level of institutional quality and 0.32 (p<0.05) at a high level of 
institutional quality. The results further support Hypothesis 3, which proposes that the 
positive relationship between subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance is 
stronger when institutional quality is low.  
INSERT FIGUREs 2 & 3 NEAR HERE 
In order to have a better understanding on how institutional quality moderates 
the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy, and between subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance, we plotted the interaction effects in Figures 2 
and 3. As shown in Figure 2, a high level of expatiate staffing is associated with a low 
level of autonomy in conditions of high host-country institutional quality. In Figure 3, 
it can be seen that greater autonomy is related to a high level of subsidiary 
performance in the host countries with low institutional quality. Both Figure 2 and 
Figure 3 further support Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 respectively. 
In summary, we find that the level of subsidiary autonomy mediates the 
relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance. In addition, the results 
also show that the effect of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy and the impact of 
subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance are moderated by host-country 
institutional quality. 
 
Discussion 
Based on a sample of Chinese MNEs, we have examined whether subsidiary 
autonomy mediates the impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance, and have 
considered the moderating effect of the institutional quality of host countries on the 
mediation mechanism. Our findings show that subsidiary autonomy, to a large extent, 
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serves as a key mediator of the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
performance. By assigning expatriates to a subsidiary, the MNE parent may grant less 
autonomy to the subsidiary, which in turn reduces subsidiary performance. In other 
words, the power relationship between a subsidiary and its parent will shift toward the 
subsidiary when the level of expatriates decreases. The results differ from those of the 
majority of previous studies which reported a direct relationship between expatriation 
and subsidiary performance (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003a; Richards, 
2001).  
We further examined the interrelationship between expatriates, subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance given different levels of institutional quality. 
The findings indicate that the level of expatriates is used as a strategic control and 
resource exchange mechanism by EEMNEs. Specifically, high quality institutions in 
host countries induce EEMNE parents to send fewer expatriates, which results in a 
high level of subsidiary autonomy. This suggests that subsidiaries are motivated to 
engage in asset exploration in those host countries by granting them a high level of 
autonomy. There may be more resource exchanges between subsidiaries and local 
firms in host countries with well-established institutions. Thus, the negative 
relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy is reinforced in host 
countries with high institutional quality. When subsidiaries are located in host 
countries with a high institutional quality, they may be able to employ more local 
employees and engage more closely with local suppliers and clients. The findings 
suggest that the impact of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary 
performance varies depending on host-country institutional quality. The nature of 
strategic asset-seeking outward FDI from emerging economies is also reflected in the 
relationship between the corporate parents and subsidiaries. When EEMNE 
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subsidiaries operate in host countries with well-established institutions, they tend to 
establish a decentralised organizational structure which facilitates knowledge access 
and knowledge acquisition. For example, Lenovo acquired IBM’s PC division in 2004, 
and appointed the IBM’s Senior Vice President, Steve Ward, as the first foreign senior 
executive of the PC division of Lenovo in order to maintain knowledge access and 
customer acceptance (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
In contrast, the link between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy is reversed 
from negative to positive in host countries with lower institutional quality. Our 
findings suggest when subsidiaries operate in a host country with a high level of 
uncertainty and risk, they rely on both expatriates and subsidiary autonomy to respond 
to the frequent changes and to counterbalance the impact of the risky environment. 
The findings indicate that EEMNEs are likely to use more expatriates in host  
countries with low institution quality compared to those in the host countries with 
high institution quality. Thus, the level of expatriates not only acts as an internal 
control mechanism but also a means of intra-organisational or internal resource 
exchange between the MNE parent and subsidiary when external resource exchanges 
are unreliable and subject to high transaction cost due to great uncertainty in the host 
countries. In other words, subsidiaries operating in a host country with low 
institutional quality need to have additional autonomy and extra expatriates from 
headquarters. In this way, they are able to use intra-organisational resource flows to 
reduce their external dependence on local staffing. This finding also shows the 
importance of investigating the moderating effect of institutional quality. EEMNEs 
are sensitive to local institutional quality. EMNE parents support their subsidiaries in 
lower institutional quality countries with a higher level of expatriates and give them 
autonomy to run local subsidiaries according to the local environment, whereas in 
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countries with higher institutional quality, parental firms tend to use a lower level of 
expatriates which leads to a higher level of autonomy.  
Our findings show that there is a substitution effect between subsidiary 
autonomy and host-country institutional quality on subsidiary performance. 
Subsidiary autonomy becomes increasingly important in boosting performance in host 
countries with low institutional quality. The higher autonomy will enable effective 
local decision making to quickly respond to dynamic market changes and absorb 
uncertainty in such countries. In comparison, in countries with high institutional 
quality, subsidiary autonomy becomes less important in improving performance due 
to the benefits associated with a well-established institutional environment, such as 
reduced transaction costs and easier access to knowledge and resources. This study 
reveals that Chinese MNEs tend to assign more expatriates and grant more autonomy 
to the subsidiaries located in the countries with low institutional quality in order to 
enhance subsidiary performance.  
Contributions  
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, unlike 
previous studies which emphasised the effect of expatriates on performance in 
isolation, this study examines the interconnection between expatriates, subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance. Such an investigation enables us to provide 
new insights into how EEMNEs resolve the tension between expatriates and 
subsidiary autonomy in achieving desirable performance. The findings improve our 
understanding of the mechanisms through which the effect of expatriates on 
subsidiary performance is realized. Thus, our study fills an important research gap, 
given that much research in this domain has mainly focused on the direct link between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance.   
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Secondly, while previous studies have predominantly focused on the impact of 
expatriates from well-established MNEs (Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Gaur, Delios, 
& Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003a), few have examined the role of expatriates from 
EEMNEs in a variety of host countries with diverse institutional qualities (Turcan & 
Juho, 2012). Our study fills this gap by investigating the adaptive subsidiary control 
strategies of Chinese MNEs. The findings provide new insights into the contingent 
impact of host-county institutional quality on the links between expatriates, subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance.  
Finally, this study is one of the first to investigate the indirect relationship 
between expatriates and subsidiary performance, taking account of the mediating role 
of autonomy granted to the subsidiary and the moderating role of the institutional 
quality of host countries. It extends the extant literature on the subsidiary performance 
of EEMNEs and provides much needed evidence on the complex relationship between 
expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance, given the institutional 
quality of host countries. In particular, the findings enrich our understanding of how 
EEMNEs in the early stage of internationalization adjust expatriates and subsidiary 
autonomy to achieve overseas success in a variety of host countries. 
 
Managerial relevance 
Our findings have a number of managerial implications for practitioners. First, the 
evidence shows that subsidiary autonomy is an important mediator linking expatriates 
and subsidiary performance. Because of the negative relationship between expatriates 
and subsidiary autonomy, and the positive relationship between subsidiary autonomy 
and performance, foreign subsidiaries will be able to achieve a higher level of 
performance when they are granted a higher level of autonomy. This implies that 
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EMNE parents should adopt a light touch approach by delegating their subsidiaries 
more power and authority for decision making to achieve overseas success.   
Second, we have found that the relationship between expatriates, subsidiary 
autonomy and performance varies depending on host country institutional quality. 
Therefore, host-country institutional quality is an important factor that EMNE 
managers should consider when determining a suitable level of expatriate personnel. 
In other words, different institutional environments require a different balance of 
expatriates and subsidiary autonomy. Subsidiaries should be granted more autonomy 
together with an increased level of expatriates from headquarters when investing in 
host countries with under-developed institutions, but fewer expatriates and a higher 
level of autonomy when operating in host countries with high institutional quality.  
In addition, we found that subsidiary autonomy relates more positively to 
subsidiary performance when institutional quality is lower, rather than higher. This 
suggests that EEMNEs should consider granting a higher level of subsidiary 
autonomy to the subsidiary in such circumstances as this can reduce a subsidiary’s 
logistic costs and therefore increase efficiency. Subsidiary autonomy could be adopted 
as a strategic response to environmental uncertainty in those host countries with low 
institutional quality. EMNE managers should understand the importance of autonomy 
and flexibility when their subsidiaries are operating in an environment with a high 
uncertainty and political risk. They need to pay particular attention to intra-firm 
resource exchange and reducing organisational rigidity and external dependence.  
 
Limitations and future studies 
This study has several limitations that suggest future research directions. First, a 
perceptual measure of subsidiary performance is used in this study. Further work 
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could use objective measurements to evaluate the effect of expatriates on the different 
dimensions of subsidiary performance. Second, our study only focused on Chinese 
MNEs. A comparative study using different countries of origin would help verify 
whether the findings are specific to the Chinese context. Third, expatriates are 
heterogeneous and vary in terms of skills and ability (Zhang & Fan, 2014). Future 
research is needed to further test whether different types of expatriates affect 
subsidiary performance indirectly via subsidiary autonomy in host countries with 
different institutional environments.  Furthermore, our study only tested one mediator 
and one moderator, namely subsidiary autonomy and the institutional quality of host 
countries. Future studies could examine whether other factors, such as knowledge 
transfer and cultural distance, also serve as mediating and moderating mechanisms. 
Doing so will further expand our understanding of the complex relationship between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance. 
Conclusion 
Adopting the resource dependence perspective, this paper examines the 
indirect effects of expatriates via subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance, 
based on a sample of Chinese MNEs operating in host countries with different levels 
of institutional quality. We find that assigning more expatriates enables the parent 
company to have tighter control on subsidiaries and reduce their autonomy, which in 
turn leads to a decrease in subsidiary performance. The results show that subsidiary 
autonomy mediates the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance. 
Such a relationship is moderated by host countries’ institutional quality. The 
institutional quality of host countries reinforces the negative impact of expatriates on 
subsidiary autonomy, but reduces the importance of the latter on subsidiary 
performance. By examining the moderating effect of host-country institutional quality, 
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this study sheds new light on the contingency of the institutional environment of a 
host country and EEMNEs’ subsidiary performance. Thus, our study advances 
research on the post-entry organisational structure of EEMNEs by providing new 
insights into the role of expatriates and subsidiary autonomy as mechanisms of 
external dependence reduction and knowledge exploration in host countries with 
different institutional qualities. 
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Appendix A: 
We tested the hypothesis on the mediating effects of subsidiary autonomy on the 
relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance based on Edwards and 
Lambert’s constrained nonlinear regression module (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). A 
first and second-stage moderated mediation model is involved in estimating the 
following two equations: 
                                                   (1) 
         (2) 
where X is expatriates; Z is institutional quality; XZ is the product of 
expatriates and institutional quality; M is a subsidiary autonomy; MZ is the product 
of subsidiary autonomy and institutional quality; and Y is subsidiary performance.  
Equation 3 is obtained by substituting Equation 1 into Equation 2: 
(3) 
In Equation 3, the direct effect of X (expatriates) on Y (subsidiary 
performance) corresponds to the term ( , which varies by Z 
(institutional quality). The indirect effect of X on Y corresponds to 
, which also varies by Z. The term   
captures the first-stage moderation of the indirect effect, and the term 
captures the second-stage moderation of the indirect effect. 
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Table 1: The locations of Chinese overseas subsidiaries  
 
Investment Destinations: host countries   
Algeria, Australia, Austria,  Bengal, Brazil, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada,   Congo, 
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Germany,  Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, Iran, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, 
Sudan, Tanzania, the UK, the USA, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam 
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Table 2: Measurement scales and factor loadings 
 
Constructs Measurement items Factor loading 
Variance 
explained 
(%) 
Cronbach’
s alphas 
Subsidiary performance    83.81 α=0.90 
CR=0.89, AVE=0.74 • Sale growth 0.84   
 • Local market share growth 0.90   
 • Sales margin growth 0.83   
     
Subsidiary autonomy   72.58 α=0.87 
CR=0.88, AVE=0.64 • Right to decide the scope of operations by heads of overseas subsidiary 0.82   
 • Right to decide budgetary and financial decisions by heads of overseas subsidiary 0.87   
 • Right to hire, reward, promote and fire employees by heads of overseas subsidiary 0.87   
 • Right to do mergers and acquisitions and other capital operations by overseas subsidiary 0.63   
     
Institutional quality   84.59 α=0.92 
CR=0.96, AVE=0.81 • Voice and Accountability 0.73   
 • Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 0.81   
 • Government Effectiveness 0.96   
 • Regulatory Quality 0.95   
 • Rule of Law 0.97   
 • Control of Corruption 0.94   
CR, composite reliability; AVE, average variance extracted
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Table 3: Descriptive statistic and correlations 
 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. MNC parent age 20.17 15.09 1.00         
2. Subsidiary age 5.18 2.88 0.03 1.00        
3. MNC parent size 2.81 0.92 0.41** 0.02 1.00       
4. Parent ownership 0.25 0.43 0.31** -0.03 0.07 1.00      
5. Subsidiary Industry 0.25 0.43 0.07 0.17* 0.19* -0.07 1.00     
6. Subsidiary performance 4.48 1.01 0.06 0.07 0.26** -0.11 0.19** 1.00    
7. Expatriates 46.37 35.17 0.12 -0.09 0.12 0.18* -0.04 -0.13 1.00   
8. Subsidiary autonomy 4.53 1.15 -0.01 0.04 0.15* -0.14 0.24** 0.43** -0.15* 1.00  
9. Institutional quality 2.93 0.98 -0.07 0.13 -0.31** 0.01 -0.13 -0.22** -0.07 -0.10 1.00 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Table 4: Coefficient estimates for the moderated mediation model for subsidiary performance 
  First stage (dependent variable = SA)   Second stage (dependent variable = performance) 
 Module 1   Module 2   Module 3   Module 4 
  α SE t   α SE t   α SE t   α SE t 
Subsidiary age 0.00 0.03 0.00  0.00 0.03 -0.03  0.08 0.02 1.12  0.07 0.02 1.12 
MNC parent age  0.06 0.01 0.74  0.04 0.01 0.51  0.03 0.00 0.46  0.02 0.00 0.26 
MNC parent size -0.02 0.08 -0.28  -0.03 0.08 -0.39  0.10 0.07 1.42  0.09 0.07 1.34 
Ownership  -0.12 0.17 -1.52  -0.10 0.17 -1.47  -0.07 0.14 -1.07  -0.07 0.14 -1.07 
Industry 0.23 0.18 2.97**  0.23 0.18 3.30**  0.04 0.14 0.59  0.05 0.14 0.82 
Expatriates -0.15 0.00 -2.02*  0.19 0.00 2.74**  -0.07 0.00 -1.03  0.11 0.00 1.75 
Institutional quality -0.09 0.08 -1.21  0.07 0.08 0.97  -0.22 0.06 -3.10**  0.04 0.06 0.66 
Subsidiary autonomy         0.43 0.08 5.08**  0.51 0.08 6.03** 
Expatriates x institutional quality     -0.37 0.00 -5.11**      -0.20 0.00 -3.10** 
Subsidiary autonomy x institutional quality             -0.19 0.01 -2.94* 
                
R2   0.10       0.24       0.26       0.38   
Adjusted R2  0.06    0.21    0.23    0.35  
Note: SA=subsidiary autonomy; SE=standard error. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01;  
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Table 5: The effects of the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy and between subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary 
performance at different levels of institutional quality 
Model  Institutional quality First stage Second stage 
E-SCM-Performance Low  0.55* 0.70* 
 High -0.17* 0.32* 
 Difference 0.72* 0.38* 
Note. The first and second-stage simple effects for low and high levels of institutional quality were calculated with coefficient estimates from Table 3. 
Institutional quality was +0.98 (i.e. one SD above the mean) and -0.98 (i.e. one SD below the mean) for the high and low levels of institutional quality, 
respectively. Differences in simple effects were calculated by subtracting the effects for high institutional quality from the effects for low institutional quality. 
Significant tests for the first and second-stage simple effects are equivalent to tests for the coefficients of the interaction terms in the first and second-stage 
model in Table 4, respectively.  
E = expatriates; SCM = subsidiary autonomy.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Figure 1. The conceptual framework 
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Figure 2: The effect of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy in host countries with high 
and low levels of institutional quality 
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Figure 3: The effect of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance in host 
countries with high and low levels of institutional quality 
 
